A Conversation with Cory Doctorow and Hal Stern 41
ChelleChelle writes "In a rare meeting, popular sci-fi writer and co-editor of the blog Boing Boing Cory Doctorow and Sun VP Hal Stern consider the open source approach. The resulting interview deals with the pros and cons of going open source, as well as the issues of security and privacy. From the article: 'It seems to me that one of the big problems with the filters you've just identified is who gets to set policy in the machine. As a science fiction writer, I am offended by sci-fi movies where it turns out that the rocket ship has a self-destruct button, it has been pressed by accident, and now the whole thing is going to explode. ... By the same token, I often wonder whether trusted computing architectures that allow remote parties to enforce policy on your hardware are a good idea. Although we can imagine beneficent examples of this, this is what spyware is, by definition, right? Spyware is remote parties setting policies on your computer against your wishes. Is it ever a good idea?'"
Scifi FOSS Punditry? (Score:2)
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You are a couple of weeks late. So it goes.
Cory's shirt (Score:1)
Re:Cory's shirt (Score:4, Informative)
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Cory Doctorow (Score:5, Insightful)
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Throw him in the room with Paris Hilton and they'd explode in an instantaneous mass->energy conversion.
Still, I love his books.
Re:Cory Doctorow (Score:4, Insightful)
I sometimes wonder if Cory and Xeni Jardin have hit on some sort of self-satirical performance art, and we're just not in on the joke.
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http://xkcd.com/c239.html [xkcd.com]
http://flickr.com/photos/laughingsquid/437389857/i n/photostream/ [flickr.com]
(via http://www.waxy.org/links/ [waxy.org] btw)
So the answer to your question is probably that the joke isn't(particularly, anyway) funny.
Don't lend Trusted computing legitimacy (Score:4, Insightful)
What will help computer security are good security practices.
At my house, everyone logs in to a Linux powered Domain, LDAP coated in SSL for Authorization, Kerberos for Authentication. Traffic (especially Wifi) encapsulated with IPSec. SE Linux policies in place. Directory service authorized Radius Server with MySQL server Accounting, and cataloged MAC Addresses in OpenLDAP. These are good security policies. Everyone should have some variation of this.
If I were on a space ship, I damned well better be able to secure my systems against unauthorized access. But DRM and TCPA do not make this happen.
Re:Don't lend Trusted computing legitimacy (Score:5, Insightful)
Good security practice starts with a question: "What am I protecting?". If it isn't particularly valuable, you don't spend a lot of money(or time) securing it.
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(the air conditioner thing is the idea that there is some cost to having the security; running an air conditioner in May costs more than opening a window, but in most places, it doesn't result in more comfort)
forgot the self destruct mechanism .. (Score:2)
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At my house, everyone logs in to a Linux powered Domain, LDAP coated in SSL for Authorization, Kerberos for Authentication. Traffic (especially Wifi) encapsulated with IPSec. SE Linux policies in place. Directory service authorized Radius Server with MySQL server Accounting, and cataloged MAC Addresses in OpenLDAP. These are good security policies. Everyone should have some variation of this.
Seriously, has your family tried to kill you, or maybe send you to a therapist?
If they haven't, you should thank them for being so patient. Most people I know are far too annoyed to bother with password-protecting their windows account, let alone participate in such tinfoil-hat activities as encrypting their wireless signals.
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True, there's also the added fun of feeling like a secret agent. So I can see where s/he's coming from ;)
If the whole internet or some government really did have it in for me, though, I probably wouldn't be posting my security practices on slashdot, as cool as they do sound.
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I've lived on systems more stringent thn the parent poster dscribes, and didn't even notice. Multics with Access Isolation Mechanism, and (Real, Military) Trusted Solaris.
Almost all of that could be provided by a dedicated machine running the NSA's Linux and sold as a firewall, with negligable setup involved for ordinary users.
The family wouldn't even notice.
--dave
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I'm still getting replies to this? Ok, let's relax. I know. I know. I was just making a joke about the arguably excessive measure of security for a home network.
Oh, and the logon screen wouldn't be the source of frustration. They're not employees; they're family, and they might wonder/worry/be annoyed with their brother/sister spending so much time locking down the home computer network and not interacting with loved ones. Or maybe they are bothered by what they perceive as an unhealthy level of par
I can not let you do this Dave... (Score:2)
That was an imposter! (Score:2)
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Somebody had to do it (Score:2, Funny)
On the bright side, Cory is using an analogy that might spark some brain cells in the semi-joe sixpack crowd.
Not Trusted Computing (Score:2)
Rather, it provides a way for people to prove what policies they are enforcing on their own machines. And thereby that will allow someone to say, I won't give you this data unless you are running a certain policy (that will protect my data). Today, that wouldn't really work because they couldn't tell what policies you were running. But with Trusted Computing, it will be possible. You will be able to prove your poli
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it provides a way for people to prove what policies they are enforcing on their own machines
Sure. But the problem is that you have the odd notion that that would actually be secure against the owner choosing to alter or override his own security settings... the "policy"... on his own computer.
A typical "policy" would be that the computer will not do X, Y , or Z, and that the com
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1. Owners want to violate their own policies.
Then you're not really following your stated policy, are you? Either you can make binding commitments or you can't. Do you really think that no one should be able to make binding commitments, or feel obligated to be held to them if they do make them? You realize that is the basi
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Rather, it provides a way for people to prove what policies they are enforcing on their own machines.
That's a sneaky way to say "it provides a way for other people to require you to enforce a certain policy on your own machine".
Sure, you might argue it's not really a requirement, because you can always just "opt out". But that's like saying the Mark of the Beast [wikipedia.org] is optional because you can always just "opt out" of buying and selling. I don't want to facilitate an economy where getting data is dependent on enforcing certain restrictions on your own hardware, even if it is, technically, optional (at least i
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it is a good idea... (Score:2)
If you actually own all the remote machines. For example your workers do their job at home.
M$ doesn't own my machine.