San Francisco DA Discloses City's Passwords 333
snydeq writes "The office of San Francisco District Attorney Kamala Harris has made public close to 150 usernames and passwords used by various departments to connect to the city's VPN. The passwords were filed this week as Exhibit A in a court document arguing against a reduction in $5 million bail in the case against Terry Childs. Though they placed the passwords in the public record, city prosecutors do seem to think that they are sensitive. InfoWorld's Paul Venezia, who has been following the case closely, provides further analysis of the technical details in the city's case. 'By themselves, [the passwords] would not be enough to allow anyone to access the network via VPN,' Venezia writes, 'but the fact that the city entered them into evidence is quite shocking. At the very least, they'll have to shut down their VPN access for awhile until they've changed them all and modified the configurations of some large number of VPN clients.'"
Ah HA! (Score:5, Insightful)
Re:Ah HA! (Score:5, Interesting)
Why did the DA even have access to these passwords? Why were they not in hash form? Did Child's have anything to do with that part?
Re:Ah HA! (Score:5, Insightful)
My first thought. Whenever a password is stored in a form that it could be retrieved (rather than only reset), the users should be notified beforehand, otherwise it's just unethical IMO...not to mention the security issues.
Re:Ah HA! (Score:5, Insightful)
There are NO circumstances under which one user should possess another user's password; not even an Administrator. The only exception to this rule ever allowed is when the account is first created: when a one-time use password is assigned by the Administrator; however, in a world-class IT infrastructure (such as an enterprise like the city of SF can afford to implement) an application creates and assigns a random password and then communicates it to the user via secure means (with no person seeing or having access to that password).
Re:Ah HA! (Score:4, Informative)
Your comment is true, and so few IT organizations actually understand what you have said. However, these are "phase one" passwords. These particular passwords are the ones that allow a system to communicate with the network to even begin the process of authenticating a user. Any good admin must have these, as it is the admin that creates them and they cannot be changed after the fact. If you change one, you will have to go through and rebuild the certificate on the other device that is requesting access.
Interestingly, the DA is exposing the network even more than people know. Since this is essentially a defense in depth strategy, a lot of times the secondary password measures put in place (ie, authenticating the users) are weaker and more hackable. As admins know the first phase one measure is in place, the second one usually isn't as strong or monitored as well. After all, it isn't usually subject to brute force attacks.
Now San Fransisco's weakest and most sensitive set of passwords are subject to brute force attacks in a free-for-all on the internet. Since there are so many passwords published, quite possibly the attacks could be from multiple vectors to multiple edge devices. Seems the DA is either wildly incompetent (by virtue of not getting high end consulting advice on this subject) or has some legal reason to ensure the network is hacked. Either way, yikes.
RTFA (Score:5, Informative)
From the article:
So, in answer to your questions: probably because the police found them as a result of their investigation, because Childs allegedly kept them in plaintext, and yes, allegedly, Childs had plenty to do with it.
Do you have any other questions? Perhaps the article answers them.
Re: (Score:3, Insightful)
Why are these introduced in a bail hearing? Is he going to sell them to buy a plane ticket to a non-extradition country? Could he use a network access password to arrange travel as a third party and avoid prosecution?
These login/passwords were found on his office computer. How the hell do you think he is going to access this computer even if he is free on bail? Something tells me he will have a very hard time obtaining this data.
Re:RTFA (Score:5, Insightful)
Re:RTFA (Score:4, Insightful)
DA is retarded (Score:4, Insightful)
Honestly the more I read about this the worse SF managers and the DA look. How dumb are they, I mean they are disproving their own case, if I were Childs' lawyer, I would ask this question to the DA in front of the jury "Just so I get this straight, because I am a simple man, you are telling us that this information was so confidential and put the city at so much risk that you publicized it yourself the same day that you made a statement about the dangers of Childs potentially releasing the information? Did you make sure the passwords and usernames were changed before doing so? Isn't it possible that the usernames alone being published could create a target point for hackers to work from? Allowing them to launch either DOS attacks if lockouts are set on thes accounts or to continually work on cracking passwords if no lockout is set? Do you even have the technical knowledge to understand the details of this case without you yourself putting the city at risk like you 'allege' my client has? If Childs put the city at risk by having it on his computer and deserves jail time, what punishment should you get for filing it into the court records? Didn't security concerns worry you? Where is the confirmation the passwords were updated or the account deactivated before you entered sensitive information with the court?"
This is out of a comic stripe, SF is run by idiots. Childs is not the problem it is those that let him control everything so long as he did their work for them. Those are the people who should be on trial. It is a retarded DA that is 1). Putting city systems are risk for a prosecution and 2). Given the defense more ammunition.
Re: (Score:3, Interesting)
maybe it's a bluff. Now that they've put them in the public record, they can go to the judge and say "we KNOW he has access to this username\password list, because we just made it available to him, so you can't let him out incase he uses it to damage the network". Which would be very slimy indeed, but then they're lawyers, slimey is their modus operandi.
On another note, isn't the POINT of the 8th amendment to stop bail deliberately set so high that the person being held cannot hope to post it? (which seems
Re: (Score:3, Informative)
On another note, isn't the POINT of the 8th amendment to stop bail deliberately set so high that the person being held cannot hope to post it? (which seems to be what the DA here wants)
Bail is considered excessive in relation to the crime alleged, not to the means of the defendant, even though the means of the defendant is considered when setting bail.
In other words, your inability to afford bail is not one of the defining characteristics of "excessive bail".
Re:RTFA (Score:5, Interesting)
Do they even know what those "usernames" and "passwords" are for? Did they check any documentation or did they just assume that the list was a list of individual users and passwords that Childs could use to wreck havoc?
After reading the article, it seems like the list consists of Cisco VPN group names and pre-shared keys, not usernames and passwords. To someone who isn't familiar with the technology, it would look like a username and password, and I'm sure they are counting on the technological ignorance of the Judge and the general public to keep up this charade.
It will be interesting when this thing finally goes to trial. The city is probably going to end up eating its words.
Re: (Score:3, Insightful)
The reason for password disclosure (Score:5, Informative)
The username/password combos were apparently functioning sets. The DA is saying they found them on Child's own computer. The DA is all in a tizzy because Child's could then use these accounts to sneak into the system and cause mischief without getting tracked back.
Right. The only guy in the world with God level access to this network needs fake usernames/passwords so he can 'cause mischief'?
Give me a fucking break. I can think of many reasons for him to have those combos on his personal system.
Apparently the less than brilliant DA's office is unaware that the GOD level admin has the ability to do anything at all on the network and REMOVE ALL TRACES IN THE LOGS afterwards. It's trivial, when you're the one who runs the tattletales.
Dear DA office: IF YOU LOOK HARD YOU'LL UNDOUBTEDLY FIND EVIDENCE TRACY EAVESDROPPING ON THE NETWORK SNIFFING AND ATTEMPTING TO ILLEGALLY PENETRATE THE SYSTEM. IT'S PART OF HIS JOB, MORONS. IF YOU KEEP BRINGING THIS CRAP UP, YOU'LL ONLY LOOK STUPIDER.
Keep this up, and Nifong will have company in the 'worlds dumbest DA's club'
Re:The reason for password disclosure (Score:5, Insightful)
from TFA --
The username/password combos were apparently functioning sets. The DA is saying they found them on Child's own computer. The DA is all in a tizzy because Child's could then use these accounts to sneak into the system and cause mischief without getting tracked back.
Right. The only guy in the world with God level access to this network needs fake usernames/passwords so he can 'cause mischief'?
Give me a fucking break. I can think of many reasons for him to have those combos on his personal system.
They should have (but maybe do not) procedures for suspicious accounts. If they don't Childs should have created and documented one.
He's got accounts so he can log in with a lower level of access and see what's accessible
More reasonable, but 150 of them? That doesn't seem plausible.
These are usernames/password combos that he sniffed off the network, during routine security testing.
Possibly, but why did he need to keep a copy of the password file? If his goal was to uncover security vulnerabilities, it isn't necessary to keep the credentials uncovered.
These are people with accounts that have had some kind of trouble, and he's got them so he can attempt to diagnose problems linked to user level access.
It is not standard nor best practice to ask a user for their password, ever. If you need to access their account, you use admin privs to change their password, do whatever needs to be done, then ask the user to change it themselves when you no longer need access to their account.
It's a list of post-it pad's he's seen while walking around at work, and he'd been planning to inform the users to change their passwords.
You need the user's name for that. Not their login ID and password. Also, the number of passwords in the file makes this implausible.
They're the output list of a password security checker.
I think this one is redundant. While it is best practice to examine the security of your own network, it is not common nor reasonable to keep an archive of usernames/passwords uncovered.
Apparently the less than brilliant DA's office is unaware that the GOD level admin has the ability to do anything at all on the network and REMOVE ALL TRACES IN THE LOGS afterwards. It's trivial, when you're the one who runs the tattletales.
Dear DA office: IF YOU LOOK HARD YOU'LL UNDOUBTEDLY FIND EVIDENCE TRACY EAVESDROPPING ON THE NETWORK SNIFFING AND ATTEMPTING TO ILLEGALLY PENETRATE THE SYSTEM. IT'S PART OF HIS JOB, MORONS. IF YOU KEEP BRINGING THIS CRAP UP, YOU'LL ONLY LOOK STUPIDER.
Keep this up, and Nifong will have company in the 'worlds dumbest DA's club'
I think you should examine the well-documented, published, and logical security & administration best practices. Keeping a password list on a PC is a great way to compromise your network. If it turns out that these are, indeed, valid user security credentials, Childs doesn't appear to know the first thing about information security.
Re:The reason for password disclosure (Score:5, Insightful)
It is not standard nor best practice to ask a user for their password, ever. If you need to access their account, you use admin privs to change their password, do whatever needs to be done, then ask the user to change it themselves when you no longer need access to their account.
Actually that IS standard practice...but for desktop techs, not admins. I often have to admonish people for this, but it's quite a common practice to get the user's password so as to facilitate service. It certainly isn't a best practice, but it's a common one and in most cases it inconveniences the user far less.
Re:The reason for password disclosure (Score:5, Insightful)
Please, no biometrics. I can change my password/smart card/whatever else quite easily, but I can never change my iris or fingerprints or what have you.
yeah, but DA knows what to do? (Score:3, Interesting)
They released ALL damn passwords in a public record.
Anyone (who already has physical access to this network), which could be quite many people, could have various degree of access to the network.
I'm sure hackers who already got a way to the network perimeter would like these passwords too.
The ensuing chaos will prove he was right, sadly they will make him the scapegoat for it too, none will see (or admit) Childs was right.
Re:The reason for password disclosure (Score:4, Insightful)
7. Cisco PCF files w/ the group names, etc, filled in.
That's probably what this is, and the increasingly desperate prosecutor is trying to find things that can be used to dazzle the jury.
Dang! (Score:5, Insightful)
AH HA! See, Childs was right , he is the only competent one!
Dang! You beat me to posting about it.
Wasn't part of Childs' point that password security in the S.F. government was lax and that divulging the big one in a way that would spread it around was dangerous to the network?
Given that the configurations on the routers weren't saved, the first guy to use that password on them had better be DARNED careful to get them recorded before changing anything or he's likely to break the network big time. So handing it to an administrator, who will hand it to several people, any of whom might leak it, could cause the net to come crashing down.
If all they'll let him do for a handoff is hand off the passwords, I can see how a prima donna BOFH would want to hand the big one directly to his successor, who would then spend the next week carefully recording the configs as-running before making changes or sharing the password with less-skilled delegates.
Not that it's right. But looks to me like the city is making his point for him - which his lawyer should use in a counter-argument at the bail hearing. B-)
Re: (Score:2)
Given that the configurations on the routers weren't saved,
Huh, wuh? Where did you get that from? All I read was that they were not written to flash on the router. That doesn't mean they weren't written to an encrypted file on a tftp server (and can be written out again with admin privs). Bollox up the router? Reboot it and you are back to normal.
Now I haven't seen explicit confirmation that the configs were tftp'able, but unless Childs is some sort of rainman of router configurations there is no way that even he could have managed more than a small handful of
Re:Ah HA! (Score:4, Interesting)
"AH HA! See, Childs was right , he is the only competent one!"
from TFA: 'Some of the passwords would benefit from a change because they are identical to the VPN log-in name or extremely easy to guess.'
wow, bad passwords, no wonder the guy was worried, using dictionary words is like not having a password as far as hackers are concerned, same deal with identical user/pass combos. i realize they use a encrypted key along with the password, but still...
Re:Ah HA! (Score:5, Insightful)
Bad IT policy, or bad users? IT is sadly not as much a dictatorship as we'd like. If enough users whine, it ends up being policy that passwords get lax. These users "are too important to have to come up with complex passwords incorporating at least 3 different character types in 8 or more characters"
Make password policies too complex, users just write them down. Frying pan, fire...welcome to IT.
Re: (Score:2)
you should teach users to write down hints that aren't the actual password, but allow them to remember what the password is.
besides, writing down passwords is only bad if you don't protect who can read the paper properly.
Re: (Score:3, Insightful)
Bad IT policy, or bad users? IT is sadly not as much a dictatorship as we'd like. If enough users whine, it ends up being policy that passwords get lax. These users "are too important to have to come up with complex passwords incorporating at least 3 different character types in 8 or more characters"
Make password policies too complex, users just write them down. Frying pan, fire...welcome to IT.
Of course! Take my PC at work: I am required to use a different password every six months, and it has to be long and contain three different character types. And after ten minutes of inactivity, my PC automatically locks the screen. Great security, right?
Except... Outsiders cannot physically get into the office, and the PC cannot be reached from the internet, so the only potential source of hackers are my colleagues. And since all data is kept on network disks anyway, and since those are accessible to every
Re:Ah HA! (Score:5, Interesting)
If you have any other opinions you'd really like entered into the public record, have at it. I'd say there's a very good chance that this discussion will be entered as evidence by the defense.:)
If anyone is counting, add my vote for the VPN passwords' disclosure being hard evidence that the IT admin was perfectly correct.
That and the fact that the SF network stayed up while the world's hackers KNEW that the network was completely unsupervised.
Frankly, if I were looking to hire somebody, I'd be chipping into this guy's defense fund. Speaking as a real-world IT manager, I'd say this guys judgement is spot on, and his admin skills are amazing.
In my own humble opinion, then SF DA's office is full of idiots.
hanzie.
Re:Ah HA! (Score:5, Insightful)
Childs' defense attorney has got to be happy about this.
"Your Honor.. I would like to direct the Court's attention to Exhibit A; the mere existence of which proves our case..."
Suddenly Childs seems quite normal (Score:5, Funny)
Re:Suddenly Childs seems quite normal (Score:4, Insightful)
Sounds more like he should have gotten a reward or a medal or something. It's funny, but this is a case of a citizen protecting a government from itself, not the other way around.
Re: (Score:2)
He's like a vigilante!
Re:Suddenly Childs seems quite normal (Score:5, Insightful)
> ...he didn't really have the authority to do that...
You don't know what he did. You only know what the aforementioned "fuckwits" allege that he did.
Re:Suddenly Childs seems quite normal (Score:5, Insightful)
But his supervisors and everyone in his department knew he was the only one -the 'go to' guy- that really had the in-depth knowledge to figure out problems and make stuff work. If they let him do that without objection or questioning his reasons, they gave their tacit approval to allow him to operate in the fashion that he did.
Re:Suddenly Childs seems quite normal (Score:4, Insightful)
If this is the level of fuckwittage he had to deal with while in his job I'm not surprised he locked others out.
As you are well aware, bureaucracy is ruled mostly by idiots. They are put into places of power with the bureaucracy for precisely this reason. Their idiocy makes them less threatening. Once arriving there, being idiots, they are suspicious of anyone smarter. They especially do not like their own idiocy shoved in their face with the constant superior intellect of those who may happen to come along. Now these idiots can do stupid things, like enter passwords into public record or fire talented sys admins, but they will not get in trouble. Why? Because its better to do the wrong thing because you are stupid than it is to do the right thing that some idiot made against the rules one time.
Re: (Score:3, Insightful)
>>bureaucracy is ruled mostly by idiots
There is a common saying wrt management/bureaucracy/gov't jobs:
"In a Hierarchy Every Employee Tends to Rise to His Level of Incompetence"
And the corollary:
"In time, every post tends to be occupied by an employee who is incompetent to carry out his duties; work is accomplished by those employees who have not yet reached their level of incompetence"
This is known as the Peter Principle. It is a deviously simple concept with far-ranging consequences: Every employee w
Then the users will change them right back (Score:2, Interesting)
Then the users will change them right back to what they were.
Where I used to work, you had to change your password every month. After you changed it three times, you could it back to the original.
So people just changed their password 4 times.
Passwords can be TOO strong. (Score:5, Interesting)
He started his speech by asking the audience, "Passwords and policies should be made as strong and secure as possible, right?"
A show of many hands.
He said, "Wrong! It is possible for a password policy to be TOO secure. Let me give you an example. It is possible to set up a security policy in NT that requires a password of at least 8 characters, which must also be mixed case, have at least one numerical digit, and at least one non-alphanumeric character, and which will require a change of password every week."
"As soon as you implement that policy, users will write their password on a post-it note, stick it to their monitor, and replace it with a new one every week. So you see, a password policy CAN be too secure for your own good."
mod parent interesting - spending karma here ... (Score:2)
Re: (Score:2)
> As soon as you implement that policy, users will write their password on a post-it note,
> stick it to their monitor, and replace it with a new one every week.
Which, for some threat models, can be an entirely reasonable thing to do.
Re: (Score:3, Funny)
I attended a lecture some years ago by a Microsoft employee who was high up in their security structure.
[...]
"Wrong! It is possible for a password policy to be TOO secure. Let me give you an example. It is possible to set up a security policy in NT that requires a password of at least 8 characters, which must also be mixed case, have at least one numerical digit, and at least one non-alphanumeric character, and which will require a change of password every week."
"As soon as you implement that policy, users will write their password on a post-it note, stick it to their monitor, and replace it with a new one every week. So you see, a password policy CAN be too secure for your own good."
This, by the way, *IS* the policy used internally at Microsoft.
Re: (Score:3, Interesting)
For a client database too which I am the sole admin, I change my password on a monthly basis in a sequence based on the product of two formulas.
The formulas are in two places, my head and a sealed envelope in the company safe. I realize someone could crack the maths if they had enough old passwords and time, but if I get hit by a car tomorrow, my boss could unseal the envelope and calculate this months password.
Re:An idiot playing a semantic game. (Score:5, Informative)
Re:An idiot playing a semantic game. (Score:4, Interesting)
I agree with the grandparent, he's just being an ass. ;-)
He's using the word "secure" in the original question in a very narrow way. Of course a password policy must be human-centric as well as containing enough randomness to not be brute forced or attacked easily through rainbow tables.
There's education in teaching users how to select strong and yet memorable passwords, and when it's OK to write them down at least partially in your wallet or strong encrypted password store.
He's being an ass because he's asking a complex question, then telling everyone they're wrong and giving a simple smug answer. You can be right and still be an ass.
An aside is the fact that we rely on passwords too much. Dual factor authentication for internal business use is relatively cheap and easy to set up in windows and linux for login, for ssh, etc. I'm genuinely surprised more people outside of the military don't use it.
Re: (Score:3, Insightful)
If you install S/KEY or OPIE on your UNIX or Linux box to manage logins, you will be presented with a random challenge string. You then plug that challenge string and your (relatively simple) password into a one-time pad password calculator, which tells you what to type into the login prompt. Voila: An easy-to-remember password that cannot be cracked by simple lookup tables. As close to perfectly secure as you're likely to get (meeting the criteria in the actual question) without being complex for the user.
Re: (Score:3, Insightful)
Please reference the title of this thread. We're way out in the weeds now, and arguing about semantics.
Here's how I see it, and you're welcome to disagree.
It appears you're defining secure as simply strength, which includes randomness, length, and character set.
I'm defining secure as, well, secure, taking in account at minimum both strength and human usability factors.
Security == strength + usability.
Strength is a subclass of secure.
Length is a subclass of strong.
Randomness is
Re:Then the users will change them right back (Score:5, Funny)
Re:Then the users will change them right back (Score:5, Funny)
It was perhaps the only time in my life I actually knew what it meant to "be at a loss for words"
I can believe it. I imagine I would have stared at him blankly for just long enough to realize he wasn't kidding before I had an aneurysm.
Re:Then the users will change them right back (Score:5, Interesting)
Are you sure this guy hadn't called support to have his password reset? Because "password" sounds like something they might reset it to, and unlikely for someone to forget.
Re: (Score:2)
Real systems involve users calling up every few months complaining they forgot their password when they end up changing it...
Password policies (Score:2)
And then you reset their password and make then pick a new one.
Password policies shouldn't be draconian. For instance, changing them frequently isn't likely to help much. I'd rather people have a secure password that they don't write on paper, and keep for a year, rather than force them to change their password every two months and encourage users to write their password down so they remember it.
Re: (Score:3, Funny)
what morons, everybody know the only secure place for your password sticky note is the underside of your keyboard
Re: (Score:3, Interesting)
Sounds like you have to use a shitty system. Real systems prevent duplicates, or even similar patterns. It can be a real pain.
...since real systems also only store a hash instead of the plaintext password, how do they know it's similar?
IN A COURT EXHIBIT?!?!?!? (Score:3, Interesting)
I had my doubts at first, but this makes it abundantly clear that Childs was right . More right than any of us might have imagined when this spin-doctored story first came out.
In hindsight he took totally reasonable, prudent measures to protect incompetent city officials from themselves. Who knows how they got into that situation, but I won't blame him for anything in light of this, and I sincerely hope a jury wouldn't either.
He should first collect damages himself, and then initiate a class action suit against the city on behalf of all their residents. Maybe put the DA in jail for criminal negligence - in fact I'd venture a guess that he's mentally defective enough to file the charges himself.
Re: (Score:2)
he's mentally defective enough
er.. make that "she"
Re: (Score:3, Insightful)
The problem is the jury will be filled with people who are clueless about computers, as the DA will remove anyone who has even the slightest knowledge of network security.
Not really "jury of your peers", but everyone unofficially agrees juries composed of dumbasses make trials nice and quick. Anyways...
As for Kamela's dumbass move? Prosecutors in the USA enjoy virtual immunity, even something as stupid as she did won't result in any repercussions - at least in the court systems - once script kiddies get a h
Re: (Score:3, Insightful)
His assets, at, IIRC $244,000 pale in comparison to what was spent on the defense ($3 million?)
As for disbarment? Big deal. He conspired with the DNA lab to illegally conceal exculpatory evidence in the case via a malicious prosecution because allegedly "he thought it would be great advertising for his re-election."
His actions in that case also cast a shadow on every successful prosecution and undermined the legal system (rightfully so IMHO)
I personally don't care about that particular case, but it clearly
The real question is... (Score:4, Funny)
Re: (Score:3, Interesting)
Re: (Score:2, Offtopic)
More evidence... (Score:2, Insightful)
top 5 list (Score:3, Funny)
The top 5:
password
admin
root
guest
t3rrych1lds1337haxx0r
Being paranoid doesn't mean you're wrong (Score:5, Insightful)
Re:Being paranoid doesn't mean you're wrong (Score:4, Interesting)
I don't think anyone who has ever worked for the government, or even seen government in action doubted that Childs was right. I think that everyone was wondering why he'd sit in jail to bring to light something that's already obvious.
Re: (Score:2)
I think that everyone was wondering why he'd sit in jail to bring to light something that's already obvious.
See this previous response here [slashdot.org]. More or less, some people have values/ethics and try to appreciate (in advance) the outcomes of their potential actions.
Re: (Score:3, Insightful)
"Free Terry Childs" T-Shirts (Score:3, Interesting)
Re: (Score:2, Insightful)
Re:"Free Terry Childs" T-Shirts (Score:4, Insightful)
Huh? What? It's not his network. He's not some kind of hero. Yeah, there are other idiots in the world, but seriously, anyone seeing Childs as some kind of champion of security is sadly, sorely mistaken.
what more proof do you need? this action demonstrates he was right. it's not "his" network but I'm pretty sure he was in charge of its security. he tried to keep it secure, for what are now obvious reasons, and he got thrown in jail for it.
Re: (Score:2)
1.2 Avoid harm to others.
"Harm" means injury or negative consequences, such as undesirable loss of information, loss of property, property damage, or unwanted environmental impacts. This principle prohibits use of computing technology in ways that result in harm to any of the following: users, the general public, employees, employers. Harmful actions include intentional destruction or modification of files and programs leading to serious loss of resources or unnecessary expenditure of human resources such as the time and effort required to purge systems of "computer viruses."
Well-intended actions, including those that accomplish assigned duties, may lead to harm unexpectedly. In such an event the responsible person or persons are obligated to undo or mitigate the negative consequences as much as possible. One way to avoid unintentional harm is to carefully consider potential impacts on all those affected by decisions made during design and implementation.
To minimize the possibility of indirectly harming others, computing professionals must minimize malfunctions by following generally accepted standards for system design and testing. Furthermore, it is often necessary to assess the social consequences of systems to project the likelihood of any serious harm to others. If system features are misrepresented to users, coworkers, or supervisors, the individual computing professional is responsible for any resulting injury.
In the work environment the computing professional has the additional obligation to report any signs of system dangers that might result in serious personal or social damage. If one's superiors do not act to curtail or mitigate such dangers, it may be necessary to "blow the whistle" to help correct the problem or reduce the risk. However, capricious or misguided reporting of violations can, itself, be harmful. Before reporting violations, all relevant aspects of the incident must be thoroughly assessed. In particular, the assessment of risk and responsibility must be credible. It is suggested that advice be sought from other computing professionals. See principle 2.5 regarding thorough evaluations.
Re: (Score:3, Insightful)
Huh? What? It's not his network. He's not some kind of hero. Yeah, there are other idiots in the world, but seriously, anyone seeing Childs as some kind of champion of security is sadly, sorely mistaken.
Way to back that up with cold hard reasoning. Oh wait, you didn't. On second look, I can see that you just spewed an emotional appeal meant to make you look righteous and perhaps glean some karma from the deal. Here, let me give a counter-argument with the same level of "insight" (and with exclamation points and the obligatory "Period." ending to boot):
Chids is a champion of security! Anyone who thinks otherwise is sorely mistaken! He was trying to help because of all the idiots he is dealing with. Period.
There is bright future... (Score:3, Funny)
I can see that there is a bright future in the cluestick market...
Password sniffing (Score:2, Interesting)
Re: (Score:3, Informative)
Accusing an administrator of password sniffing is usually pretty dumb, unless you're dumb enough to use the same password internally and for private, external applications. A top level admin has access to all your files if he wants to, without your password. Because (drumroll) he can simply log in as administrator with the according privileges. I.e. ALL privileges to view ALL files and do with them what he pleases. At least technically, legally you can have his hide, depending on contract.
I spent a few year
VPWhat? (Score:2)
Because noone knows wtf they are talking about? Certainly the issue can be contained immediately by cutting VPN access
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I'd love to see the list... (Score:3, Insightful)
This is the tip of the iceberg (Score:5, Interesting)
This is unfortunately par for our fine DA. Kamala Harris has proven herself to be an incompetent tool more often that I'd like to hear.
She has angered many San Franciscans by refusing to prosecute violent criminals, and lately, found to have been lax towards the city's worst crime of the year...the murder of a father and his two sons in the Mission by a suspected illegal alien due to the city's stupid sanctuary law.
She should be dragged out, tarred, whipped and ejected from the city, never to return.
Makes me glad I live in the one place ... (Score:3, Funny)
that has more sense than San Francisco: Louisiana!
Re: (Score:3, Funny)
Ouch! That was a cruel comparison.
I'm not saying you are incorrect.
I live about 30 minutes outside of San Francisco. What's frightening about The City is the people who live there assume everyone who criticizes them are ignorant hillbillies.
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The DA both PROVED they where wrong in locking him up, AND completely and utterly ruined their case
Isn't proving they were wrong in locking him up the same thing as ruining their case?
They wern't using a one way hash? (Score:2)
One way hash passwords have been around FOREVER. I can't believe how stupid this is.
NEVERMIND! (Score:2)
Read TFA... I think they were the VPN Group passwords, i.e. the PSK for the IPSec connection. They still would have to auth after they connected.
Strange they would have a different password per user, unless they were hardware VPN clients.
Re:NEVERMIND! (Score:5, Interesting)
It's government. To think like government in implementing something like VPN you have to conceive a solution that involves the user not having to do anything (other than maybe push a button) and this includes anything other than a standard login box. Second you have to implement this in a way that the user themselves can go home and implement this solution without any site help from anyone and zero technical knowledge. (you don't send an IT person to a State Employees home, that's asking from some kind of lawsuit). Fourth the solution must be as expensive as possible, support some local business (preferable if the business owner is connected politically with one of the local leaders) and require very few extra hours from the already overworked staff.
What does that result in? Hardware VPN boxes plugged into the network router, with the users computer plugged directly into the VPN box. Costs a lot, requires pre-configuration of the box but should require no site visits, idiots can usually successfully plug in boxes with phone support only and any reconfiguration likey requires the box to be brought back into the office as the VPN keys on the boxes are likely hard coded into a configuration on the VPN device. Likely a turn key solution so you have a hefty support contract and the vendor would likely assist with deployment and any reconfiguration resulting in a nice contract fee for reprogramming all the boxes.
My guess is some VPN box provider is going to be doing a service call on every box and netting themselves some nice profit under their support agreement.
Another interesting thing came out in the filing. (Score:5, Insightful)
According TFA, the thing about his not saving the configs to flash is a CLAIM by the city, not something confirmed by Childs.
So how do they KNOW that, if they don't have the passwords? Did they try rebooting some network boxes and have them not come up? (If so, how is it that the net is still running...)
This is looking more and more like a pointy-haired-boss SNAFU than logic-bomb job-insurance/revenge sabotage.
Re:Another interesting thing came out in the filin (Score:5, Informative)
Not having the config in flash need not make the device a brick.
All of your passwords (Score:2)
are belong to us. Or something like that. its only slightly funny to me any more. A Simpsons reference is always more appropriate.
Uhoh (Score:2)
Cashed or Cached Creditials (Score:2)
Wooo Hoo!!! Cashed.. or uhm cached credentials.. I can see crackers using their patterns for decryption schemes. Also, who knows if these passwords are used elsewhere.
These are group passwords in IPSEC profiles (Score:5, Informative)
From the referenced article - "The passwords are so-called "phase one" passwords, and must be combined with a second password to access the network, the source said. " 99% chance they are using some form of Cisco device as their VPN concentrator (most like a VPN3030, ASA or 7200 series router). If they are these passwords (one per group) are in what is called a pcf file in every employees computer that is allowed to connect. Heck, if you use a Cisco vpn it is on your computer in the following location - C:\Program Files\Cisco Systems\VPN Client\Profiles . The group pass is encrypted with weak encryption that is commonly cracked to allow linux laptops to connect using vpnc. You can do it on the web here - http://www.unix-ag.uni-kl.de/~massar/bin/cisco-decode [uni-kl.de]
The thing is, this group password's primary use is to segregate users into different buckets. E.G contractors may have on password, with different authentication methods, while permanent employees are in a different bucket, with their own authentication methods. The key thing, is that once this first password is provided, the end user still has to provide a unique username and password to gain access. So in effect, having the group password alone is meaningless.
On top of that, I frankly would not be surprised or peeved if a network engineer had possession of PCF files for the network he is responsible for. What is next? Is the DA going to try to prosecute him for having diagrams and configs of the network he is managing on his laptop?
Only in SanFransicastan (Score:2)
Information wants to be freeeeeeee like dirt and hippies and gay pride parades!!!!
For everyone who thinks Childs was right (Score:5, Interesting)
Someone at the the DA's office is the incompetent person in this case, but that does not validate his locking out of everyone competent enough to take care of the system (the people that would have replaced him at the IT department.)
Re:For everyone who thinks Childs was right (Score:4, Insightful)
The fact that the passwords could be harvested in the first place is problematic. I'm a SysAdmin and I should never have access to anyone else's passwords.
Passwords should be encrypted and non-visible. This is standard practice.
this guy will never work in IT again (Score:2)
Of course thats because he will retire to a nice tropical island when he gets his settlement from the city!
pretty obvious SF should return to typewriters. (Score:3, Interesting)
that's the only technology anybody in the city with a title is capable of directing.
Clearly this was a plot by Childs... (Score:3, Funny)
to help the City of San Francisco look stupid.
His lawyer needs to jump on this (Score:4, Insightful)
"Your honor, my client did not feel comfortable giving sensitive system passwords to idiots. I'd like to enter prosecution's boneheaded public filing as Exhibit A."
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Network not destroyed (Score:4, Insightful)
It'll be fun to see what happens, now that he's been removed from the loop.
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Sadly, "peers" doesn't mean what we wish it did, and one of the questions during voir dire will almost certainly be "have you ever worked as a network administrator before?" with an affirmative answer as grounds for dismissal from the jury pool.